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NOTES
DEATH AND TAXES-CODE SECTION 126 AND
THE DEVELOPING TAXABLE INCOME CONCEPT
When a person dies there is always one individual who retains an
interest in the deceased's lifetime activities-the tax collector. The most
reprehensible decedent will not be forgotten so long as his successors
receive proceeds which emanate to an ascertainable extent from the
decedent's lifetime activities.
Suppose, for example, the estate of John Doe includes two items-
accrued salary of $50,000 due him at his death, and common stocks
for which John had paid $60,000, worth $120,000 at the time of death.
The $170,000 is included in his gross estate for federal estate tax pur-
poses. All of his property is bequeathed to his widow.
For a one year period after John's death, his employer voluntarily
pays amounts equivalent to John's former salary to the widow. The
widow also collects the accrued salary that had been due at death and
sells the common stock for $120,000. Each of the three transactions
embodies a peculiar income tax application.
Prior to the 1942 enactment of Code Section 126,1 the voluntary
payments to the widow by the former employer probably would have
been considered a gift rather than income since the widow had rendered
no services to the employer. 2 Because the payments were voluntarily
made, no valuation could have been given them for estate tax purposes.
But the fact that the accrued salary due John at his death and the
value of the common stocks were included in his gross estate was con-
sidered sufficient justification to apply a "conversion of corpus" ra-
tionale: Neither the receipt of the right to claim the accrued salary nor
the receipt of the ownership rights in the common stock were taxable,
1. INT. RaV. CODE § 126.
2. I.T. 3329, 1939-2 Cum. BULL. 153; Louise K. Aprill, 13 T.C. 707, 711 (1940);
cf. Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937), where the court held that payments
voluntarily made by a corporation to former employees constituted gifts although the
facts clearly indicated the payments were made because of faithful past services.
In a dissenting opinion by Justices Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo and Black the controlling
element of "voluntary" was challenged: "What controls is not the presence or absence
of consideration. What controls is the intention with which payments, however voluntary,
have been made. Has it been made with the intention that services rendered in the
past shall be requited more completely, though full acquitance has been given? If so,
it bears a tax. . . ." Id. at 45. See note 61, infra.
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since "property acquired by bequest, devise or inheritance" is exempt
from income taxation by Code Section 22(b) (3) ;3 moreover, since the
rights were thus acquired, Section 113(a) (5)4 gave the widow a new
basis-fair market value of the property at her husband's death; pro-
ceeds subsequently received by her constituted a mere "conversion of
corpus" and were not subject to income tax.8
Tax exemption of the widow, however, did not mean that all these
proceeds escaped income tax under the pre-1942 law. Another section
of the Code, Section 42,7 provided for the taxation of certain proceeds
in the decedent's final income tax return which must be filed by the
decedent's representative." The value of the accrued salary due John at
his death would have been taxable in his final return.9 Although such
a result often caused an unfair bunching of income in the decedent's
final return, it was necessary in order to subject obvious income items
to taxation. Accrued salary due at death was such an income item. But
the scope of Section 42 was limited to obvious income items; while the
section was broad enough to encompass such "rights to income" where
the decedent had completed all performance necessary to mature the
right, it was never extended to cases where decedent's bundle of rights
was concentrated in property other than immediate "rights to income."
Therefore, no income would have been reportable in John's final return
despite the increased value of his common stock holdings when he died,' 0
even if the widow had merely to deliver the stock to a vendee with whom
decedent had contracted."
In the example, then, prior to 1942 the accrued salary due John
would have been taxable, but the payments voluntarily made to the
widow by the former employer and the proceeds received by the widow
when she sold the stock would have escaped all income taxation.
3. INT. REV. CODE §22(b)(3).
4. Id. at § 113(a) (5).
5. The word "basis" is a technical word used in federal tax law which designates
the amount that is used in computing gain or loss when the property involved is sold
or exchanged. Thus: Receipts-(adjusted) basis=gain, or (adjusted) basis-receipts=
loss. Cost of property is the usual basis, but there are others. See INT. REv. CODE § 113.
6. Nichols v. United States, 64 Ct. Claims 241 (1947). Many cases have indicated
the controlling nature of the Nichols case in this field; indicative are Wm. P. Blodgett,
13 B.T.A. 1243 (1928) and Kemper v. Administrator, 14 B.T.A. 931 (1928).
7. INT. REv. CODE § 42.
8. See 2 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 13.14 (1942).
9. Helvering v. Enright, 312 U.S. 636 (1941).
10. Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428 (1941).
11. Commissioner v. Alldis Estate, 140 F.2d 885 (6th Cir. 1944). At time of his
death the decedent owned 100 shares of beneficial interest in the Chrysler management
trust; prior to death the decedent had contracted for the sale of the shares to the
trust to be effective upon death. The appreciation in value of the shares during
decedent's lifetime was held not taxable under the pre-1942 Section 42.
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Such a result is of vital concern to all taxpayers. Given a certain
amount that is needed to finance the federal government, every time
certain classes of proceeds are held non-taxable the required funds must
be obtained from other taxpayers. Unless resort is made to deficit
financing, this means tax rates must be raised or, in any event, cannot
be lowered as much as would otherwise be possible. Most of the people
thus pay higher taxes because certain proceeds received by a few escape
income taxation. The purpose here is to indicate the extent to which a
1942 tax amendment sanctions a more equitable tax burden in this area.
The Revenue Act of 194212 established a new scheme for taxing
amounts received by the successor of a decedent when such amounts
result to a sufficient extent from the decedent's activities. Code Section
42 was amended' 3 so as to eliminate the necessity for including these
amounts in decedent's final return. A new section, Section 126, was
added which provides that the recipient of "income in respect of a
decedent" shall be taxable on such income. 1 4 Section 22 which defines
"income" was amended to include Section 126 income as a new com-
ponent of gross income.' 5 When proceeds are now received by a succes-
sor of a decedent, Section 126 will be of primary importance in determin-
ing the quality of such proceeds.
Well-reasoned conclusions have indicated that the scope of the 1942
amendments is to be determined by application of the purpose of the
legislature to establish a more equitable scheme of income taxation.16
Since the available legislative history merely indicates which areas have
been changedl 7 interpretation of the legislation must amalgamate such
segments into a logically-consistent whole.
12. Revenue Act of 1942 § 134, 56 STAT. 830 (1942).
13. Id. at § 134(a) ; INT. REV. CODE § 42.
14. Id. at § 134(e); Id. at § 126.
15. Id. at § 134(c) ; Id. at §22(1).
16. Note, 65 HAuv. L. REv. 1024, 1032 (1952); Polisher, Income in Respect to
the Decedent, 56 DicK. L. REv. 269, 274 (1952).
17. SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1942); H. R. REP. No. 2333,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942); Hearings before Committee on Finance on Revenue
Revision of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1942) ; Hearings before Committee oft Ways
and Means on Revenue Revision of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1942). Usage of
statutory history to any substantial extent should probably be discouraged; the various
reports are peculiarly susceptible to the manipulations of legislative craftsmanship.
See 1 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 3.26 (1942). For an argument
to the effect that the available history supports the contentions made in this paper, see
note 86, infra.
The regulations are not too relevant to this discussion. First, they are of an
evanescent quality, see T.D. 5459, 1945 Cum. BULL. 193, which significantly amended
U.S. Treas. Reg. 111 § 29.126-1. Second, the Commissioner's regulations are merely
interpretative and not by any means conclusive evidence of the law, Koshland v.
Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936).
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DECEDENT'S FINAL RETURN
Since the "conversion of corpus" approach insulated a successor
from income taxation, the only apparent solution was to tax rights
before they became corpus. This method was first utilized in the Revenue
Act of 1926 which provided that where a decedent had been reporting
income on the installment basis, his death would be deemed a disposition
and the difference between the fair market value and the decedent's basis
would be income to the decedent.' 8 To the objection that the Section
taxed unrealized gains, the courts responded that installment reporting
was a privilege and decedent had consented to 'the disposition provision.'9
But the consensual installment sales treatment solved only a fraction
of the entire problem. If the decedent had been on a cash basis, his
final return included only cash receipts as income.2 0 That the definition
of taxable income should vary in accordance with a controllable selection
of an accounting method was irrational. In the Revenue Act of 1934,
therefore, Congress sought to catch the subsequent untaxed proceeds;
Section 42 provided :21
... [I] n the case of the death of a taxpayer, there shall be
included in the gross income for the taxable period in which
falls the date of his death, amounts accrued up to the date of
his death if not otherwise properly includible in respect of such
period or a prior period.
The definitive Enright case held that this Section comprehended a
legal claim of a cash basis decedent at the time of his death, even though
the claim was based on quantun ineruit.2 2 The rationale of the case also
embraced a claim which matured solely by reason of the decedent's
death; where, for example, the decedent's contractual obligations could
be fully performed only by his death, the perfected claim was his
income.2 3 Rampant criticism of the Enright doctrine was based not upon
18. 44 STAT. 23 (1926), INT. REV. CODE §44(d).
19. Crane v. Helvering, 76 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1935).
20. See Parlin, Accruals to Date of Death for Income Tax Purposes, 87 U. PA.
L. REV. 295 (1939) ; May, Taxable Income and Accounting Bases for Determining It,
40 J. AccouNTANcY 248 (1925).
21. 48 STAT. 694 (1934) ; INT. REV. CODE § 42.
22. Helvering v. Enright, 312 U.S. 636 (1941). Enright was a member of a law
partnership. The partnership agreement provided that the estate of a deceased partner
would receive the partner's share of subsequent receipts on account of business that
had been unfinished at the partner's death. Against the contention that a right to receive
payment was a prerequisite to accrual, the court responded that accrual as used in the
statute was meant to further the policy of including in decedent's final return all assets
earned during his life even though the right was based on quantum merult.
23. First Nat'l. Bank v. Manning, 100 F.Supp. 892 (D.N.J. 1951). Decedent had
contracted with his employer that if he should die before a certain date his estate
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the fact that the cash basis was equated with the accrual basis, but rather
upon the contention that included as decedent's income were amounts
that had not "accrued" by any recognized accounting standards. 24 Grant-
ing that such concentration of income in the decedent's last return was
unfair, however, the financial fruit of the decedent's labor was certainly
income to someone. Uncritical adherence to the "conversion of corpus"
limitations on taxing a decedent's successor necessitated an artificial
classification of the person taxable.
The elimination of the "conversion of corpus" doctrine by Section
126,25 which allows a tax to be levied upon the recipient of such income,
permits a realistic response to the query, "whose income is it?" Since
bunching of income items in decedent's last return had become unneces-
sary, Section 42 was amended by replacing the above language with:
[I]n the case of the death of a taxpayer whose net
income is computed upon the basis of the accrual method of
accounting, amounts (except amounts includible in computing
a partner's net income under Section 182) accrued only by
reason of the death of the taxpayer shall not be included in
computing net income for the period in which falls the date of
the taxpayer's death.
26
Under this present Section 42, decedent's final return not only need
not, but cannot, include items which would not be includible under the
decedent's accounting method.2 7  Final returns of cash basis decedents
will be computed on the cash basis ;28 returns of accrual basis decedents,
would receive what would have been his remaining salary. The amount received by the
estate was taxable in decedent's final return since the right to payment accrued at the
very instant of his death.
24. Gemmill, Accruals to Date of Death for Income Tax Purposes, 90 U. PA.
L. REv. 702 (1942) ; Wentz, Distortion of Income Tax Occasioned by Death and the
Misapplication of Graduated Rates, 19 TAXEs 707 (1941).
25. INT. Rav. CODE § 126(a) (1). "General Rule. The amount of all items of
gross income in respect of a decedent which are not properly includible in respect of
the taxable period in which falls the date of his death or a prior period shall be
included in the gross income, for the taxable year when received, of . . . [the recipient
of the right to receive the amount]. . . ." See Ralph R. Huesman, 16 T.C. 656 (1951).
26. Revenue Act of 1942 § 134(a), now INT. REv. CODE §42.
27. Estate of Fred Basch, 9 T.C. 627 (1947). Here the decedent was on the
cash basis; his executor included in decedent's final return employment bonuses and
commissions which were not determined until after death. The Tax Court upheld the
commissioner's exclusion of these items from decedent's final return and remarked that
the only theory of inclusion would be constructive receipt since decedent had been on
the cash basis.
28. The cash basis of accounting defers recognition of income until cash is
received. The principal criticism of this accounting method is probably that it fails
to coordinate the rendering of services and the recognition of income. See PATON.
AccOUNTANT'S HANDBOOK 114 (1948). One exception to a strict requirement of receipt
is that if cash is "subject to a man's unfettered command and . . . he is free to enjoy
it at his own option . . ." realization of income cannot be avoided by refusal to claim
NOTES
on the normal accrual basis ;29 and subsequently received income items
are taxable to the recipient if they were not included in decedent's final
return.30
Where the proceeds received by the successor in interest arise from
decedent's share of partnership profits, an additional variable confronts
the courts. Code Section 188 provides that where a partner and a part-
nership have different taxable years, the personal return of the partner
will include his share of the partnership income "for any taxable year
of the partnership ending within or with the taxable year of the part-
ner." 31 Prior to the enactment of Section 126, courts generally held that
since death dissolved the partnership,32 a partnership taxable year termi-
nated with the final taxable year of the partner, and the express language
of Section 188 compelled the inclusion of decedent's share of partnership
profits to the date of death in his final return.3 3 This reasoning -applied
to both accrual and cash basis decedents even though the partnership
agreement provided specifically that the partnership would not be dis-
solved by death. 34 Undoubtedly the "lacuna" in the pre-1942 law was an
important factor in these cases.35
the amount available. Corless v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930). Another limitation on
use of the cash basis is that it must clearly reflect income, INT. REv. CODE § 41; the
Commissioner is given an additional sanction to prescribe usage of inventories, INT. Ray.
CODE § 22(c).
29. The usual accounting treatment is to accrue income only when there has been
a completed contract or sale and the amount in question has become an unequivocal
asset of the taxpayer. PATON, EssENrA.Ls OF ACCOUNTING 77 (1949). This would
eliminate the Enright rationale of accruing quantum ineruit claims.
30. Sarah L. Narischkine, 14 T.C. 1128 (1950) ; Estate of Fred Basch, 9 T.C. 627
(1947); Conner's Will, 75 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
31. INT. Rxv. CODE § 188.
32. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31(4); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 30, dis-
tinguishes dissolution from termination.
33. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 303 U.S. 493 (1938) ; the result was that
decedent's final return included his share of partnership profits for a period exceeding
sixteen months. See also Waddell v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 503 (1939). But cf.,
Henderson's Estate v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1946), where the question
was evidently one of partnership continuity as it effects the partnership informational
return. Both state law and the partnership agreement provided for continuity of the
partnership.
34. A problem arose as to the determination of partnership profits up to the date
of death when the partnership continued as an entity and only determined profits at
the end of the business year. In such a situation the actualities might have been
such that an accounting at the date of death would have disclosed a loss, all profits
being earned thereafter. The courts held that where the Commissioner prorated the
entire year's earnings and assessed a deficiency, the burden was on the taxpayer to
disprove the allocation, Darcy v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 581 (2d Cir. 1933). But where
the Commissioner sued to recover a previously refunded amount and prorated the
year's profits, the burden was on the Commissioner to prove such apportionment was
correct, United States v. Wood, 79 F.2d 286 (3rd Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S.
243 (1935). In the latter case the court stated that the Commissioner was not aided
by the presumption of correctness present in a suit to collect taxes.
35. Girard Trust Co: v. United States, 182 F.2d 921, 925 (3rd Cir. 1950).
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A current conflict in the circuits exists as to the effects of the 1942
Act on these partnership cases. Three circuits now hold that where the
partnership agreement specifically provides for continuation of the part-
nership after a partner's death, no partnership taxable year terminates
and hence Section 188 does not apply.36 The Second Circuit, however,
has held that Section 126 did not "change the law as to what items are
properly includible in a final return"; and Section 188 still controls
the results since a partnership taxable year ends with the dissolution of
the partnership at decedent's death.37 While this Second Circuit Wald-
inan case could be distinguished on the grounds that the partnership
agreement gave the decedent's executor an option to continue in the
partnership, the court pointedly refused to distinguish the conflicting
cases. The controversy now seems eligible for Supreme Court scrutiny.
A mechanical approach could be utilized which would emphasize
the entity theory of the partnership and the resultant continued existence
of the business, or the Court could say that since Section 188 provides
a tax on a partner only for partnership years ending "within or with"
the partner's tax year, it has no effect where one partnership year has
previously ended within the decedent's final tax year. (emphasis
added) Application of a more realistic policy argument would include
variations of these tests. First, the Court should refuse to apply the
entity (continued-existence) theory either if the decedent and the part-
nership had conterminous tax years, or if no partnership tax year has
yet ended within the decedent's final tax year; to do otherwise would
exclude from decedent's final return all partnership income during his
final year. 38 Second, the Court should apply the entity concept where
the tax years of partnership and taxpayer are different and a partnership
36. Commissioner v. Mnookin's Estate, 184 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Girard Trust
Co. v. United States, 182 F.2d 921 (3rd. Cir. 1950); Henderson's Estate v. Commis-
sioner, 155 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1946). While state law sanctioned the continuance of
partnerships in these cases, that should be immaterial. The federal income tax establishes
a federal question, and results are not to be controlled by state law. Lyeth v. Hoey,
305 U.S. 188 (1938).
37. Commissioner v. Waldman's Estate, 196 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1952). A dissenting
opinion was filed by Judge A. N. Hand who would have followed the Girard Trust case,
supra note 36.
38. Utilization of the entity theory here would mean that there is no distributive
share due the decedent at his death, and he is not within the strict terminology of the
statute, INT. REv. CODE § 182, hence not taxable. But so far as Code § 42 is concerned,
the 1942 amendment merely constituted a relief provision to relieve the decedent's final
return from an inequitable concentration of income. SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 100. Furthermore, the language of the present § 42 provides that the normal
accounting system of the decedent will not continue as to ". .. amounts includible in
computing a partner's net income under Section 182. . . " Supra note 26 and text
discussion. Under this first test, then, both the statute and legislative purpose reject
the entity theory and the Guaranty Trust case, supra note 33, should still control.
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year has ended within the decedent's current year, since failure to do so
would cause an unfair concentration of income in the decedent's final
return.39 A possible variance of this second test would inspect the
partnership agreement; if continued existence were mandatory, the
Court might feel more justified in applying the test than if the deced-
ent's successor were given an option to continue. While such control
over imposition of taxation might justify a different result if contem-
plated tax reduction were shown, certainly taxable results should not
turn upon knowledge of legal technicalities of form.
While Section 188 introduces uncertainty into the partnership
cases, Section 42 will mitigate the impact of a decedent's final income
tax liability. This is, however, only an incidental result of the Revenue
Act of 1942 in this area.40 The focal point of the 1942 Act is Section
126 which taxes to the decedent's successor "income in respect of a
decedent." While the definition of Section 126 income is of primary
interest, the mechanics of the statute merit a brief inspection.
OPERATION OF SECTION 126
Only where the taxable period during which decedent dies began
after January 1, 1943, will application of the 1942 Act be mandatory.
If the taxable period began during the prior nine years, the pre-1942
law controls unless "consents" are filed with the Commissioner.4 1 Reso-
lution of the problem as to when consents should be filed must be made
by contrasting the tentative concentration of income in decedent's final
return under the Enright rationale with the alternative inclusion of
Section 126 income in returns of recipients thereof. The few decisions
on the subject have emphasized the necessity of formal sworn consents
being filed by every person who would receive a right to income from
39. Application of this second test, pursuant to the controlling rationale to avoid
unfair bunching of income, indicates that the Second Circuit Waldman case, supra
note 37, is clearly erroneous. In that case decedent died in November, 1945. The
Commissioner assessed a deficiency contending that th6 executor, in addition to report-
ing decedent's share of the partnership income for the business fiscal year ended June 30,
should have reported the cash calendar-year decedent's portion of partnership income
to the date of his death. The Tax Court, 15 T.C. 596 (1950), reversed but were in
turn reversed by the Second Circuit which thus condoned an inclusion of seventeen
months partnership income in the decedent's final return. Since the statutory-relief
purpose was modified only to prevent a decedent partner's final return from reflecting
no partnership income, supra note 38, the court ignored one of the primary purposes
of the 1942 amendments.
40. Polisher, Income in Respect to the Decedent, 56 DicK. L. REv. 269, 274
(1952); Note, 65 HAav. L. REv. 1024, 1027 (1952); Compare Randolph Peyton,
44 B.T.A. 1246 (1941), with Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir.
1951).
41. Revenue Act of 1942, § 134(g), 56 STAT. 832 (1942).
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the decedent.42 While the greater scope of Section 126 would indicate
that consents will be few, not many cases concerning tax years beginning
almost ten years'ago are still subject to scrutiny.43
Once Section 126 is determined to be applicable, the person taxable
must be ascertained. Usually the income in respect of a decedent will
be taxable to the recipient, whether the estate or a successor in interest
of the decedent. If, however, the right to receive Section 126 income is
"transferred" by one entitled to receive the proceeds, the transferor of
the right will be immediately taxable upon "the fair market value of
such right at the time of such transfer plus the amount by which any
consideration for the transfer exceeds such fair market value."'44 While
an uncritically-worded special ruling has indicated that modification of
the interpretative treasury regulations are contemplated, 45 certainly the
statutory mandate is valid where the transfer is by gift. In such in-
stances the realistic Horst doctrine governs and thereby prevents tax
avoidance by transfer of a right which transfer is itself the "fruition
of an economic gain."' 46 The only amendment needed would be one to
eliminate the possibility of a bequest by a successor of the original
decedent being classified as a transfer. In such cases the successor is
himself a ddcedent, and Section 126 applies to his rights making them
taxable to those who could otherwise be termed "transferees." Any
distinction between rights of a decedent which arose during his lifetime
from his own efforts and those which he had acquired by bequest from
a prior decedent would be without substance in this area where Section
42. Larkin's Estate v. Commissioner, 167 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1948) (testamentary
trustees and residuary legatees must file consents) ; Estate of Remington, 9 T.C. 99
(1947) (allowed consents typed on return); Estate of Ingraham, 8 T.C. 701 (1947)
(charitable legatees required to file formal consents under oath with the Commissioner).
43. 10 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION § 57.04 (1942).
44. INT. REv. CODE § 126(a) (2).
45. Special Ruling, 4 P-H FED. TAX SERv. ff76,293 (1952): "[The transfer provi-
sion] is believed to be inconsistent in part with the provision of the [code] providing for
the taxing of income in respect of a decedent to the person who actually receives the
income. There is now under consideration a proposed amendment. . . ." The ruling
was necessitated by a case in which a successor had become a decedent before collecting
the "right"; the ruling is, therefore, consistent with the text discussion.
46. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). In this famous case, the taxpayer
detached unmatured bond interest coupons and presented them to his son. The son
received the interest at maturity and included it in his taxable income. The Com-
missioner assessed a deficiency against the taxpayer contending that he, rather than
his son, was taxable in regard to the interest. The Supreme Court upheld the -Com-
missioner: "The taxpayer has equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or investment and
obtained the satisfaction of his desires whether he collects and uses the income to
procure these satisfactions or whether he disposes of his right to collect it as the
means of procuring them. . . ." Id. at 117. Cf. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331
(1940), where the taxpayer was held taxable on income from a five year irrevocable
trust established for the benefit of his wife.
NOTES
126 resanctions taxation of income in respect of the second decedent.
The most immediate problem in such a case would be to determine the
"character" of the income proceeds in the hands of the second decedent's
successor.
The Act provides that Section 126 income shall be taxable to
the recipient as though decedent had lived and received the proceeds;
both the holding period and the character of the income shall be de-
termined by applying this test.47 If a right acquired by bequest were
bequeathed a second time, the statute would require use of the first
decedent's holding period and characterization. Such a problem
indicates that the rationale of Section 126 should be based upon the
fact that, since rights bequeathed by a decedent resulted from his
efforts, classification of subsequent proceeds received by successors
should relate back so as to render taxable the portion of the receipts for
which decedent was responsible.
Just as the decedent's fruitful quest for income gives rise to
inclusions of gross income in successors' returns, so too deductions
attributable to his income activities are allowable. Expenses, interest,
taxes and foreign tax credits can be deducted and credited in the estate
income tax return when paid.4 8  The payment need not be made by
the estate so long as it is liable to discharge the obligation. If the obliga-
tion is of such a nature that it is primarily a claim on property, how-
ever, then the deduction, when payment is made, will be allowed the
successor in interest who acquires the property subject to the obligation.
In only one instance will the person claiming the deduction have to
receive Section 126 income: Percentage depletion will be allowed only
to the person who receives the income to which it relates. 49
Since Section 126 income usually will be a fruition of rights that
were included in the decedent's gross estate, one additional deduction
is granted the person who is taxable on the income, a "Deduction for
Estate Tax."50 A simple illustration indicates the reason for this con-
cession.' 1 Suppose a decedent receives $100,000 immediately before his
47. INT. REv. CODE § 126(a)(3). But see Rose J. Linde, 17 T.C. 584 (1951),
where what would have been an ordinary gain if received by the decedent changed
its characterization and became capital gain to the successor. For a discussion of this
amazing case see note 77, infra.
48. Id. at § 126(b) (1).
49. Id. at §126(b) (2).
50. Id. at § 126(c).
51. "The Fourteenth Amendment no more forbids double taxation than it does
doubling the amount of the tax." Mr. Justice Holmes writing for the Court in Fort
Smith Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 251 U.S. 532 (1920). And see Waud v. United States,
48 F.2d 444 (1931), where it was held immaterial that a right to income which had
previously been subjected to estate tax was also taxed as income to the estate when
received.
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death and pays income tax thereon of $40,000; only $60,000 will be
included in his gross estate. But if the $100,000 is included first in his
gross estate and a subsequent income tax is levied on that entire amount
when a successor receives it, it could be argued that there is an inequit-
able tax on a tax. The problem arises because the taxable entity for
the estate tax is larger than any one of the entities liable for the income
taxes. Had the $100,000 been the only item in the gross estate and had
there been only one legatee, obviously Section 126 income would have
been reduced by the estate tax paid. Where specific amounts are
funnelled to various taxpayers, and the estate tax is paid by the estate
from the residue, it is a little more difficult to visualize why a deduction
should be allowed when a successor obtains his entire amount unreduced
by the estate tax. This peculiar tax result demands close scrutiny by
the estate planner since he might wish to decrease legacies and bequests
by the amount of this extra deduction allowed the recipients and increase
the amounts given the residuary legatees from whose shares the estate
tax is usually paid. 5
2
With a preliminary comprehension of the scope of income taxable
to a decedent in his final return, and an acquaintance with the mechanics
of the statute, the primary inquiry as to precisely what constitutes
"income in respect of a decedent" becomes more meaningful.
PURVIEW OF SECTION 126 INCOmE-GRADATIONS OF SOURCE
To determine what proceeds constitute Section 126 income, analysis
is best made by considering the source of the amounts received. An
old income tax analogy, modified, whereby proceeds are said to arise
from a seed, fruit or tree, is useful. A successor who receives amounts
because of decedent's lifetime activities, but which amounts had not
become legal claims at decedent's death, benefits because of a "seed"
planted by decedent. When the amounts paid the successor are in satis-
faction of a legal right to income, such as accrued wages, owned by
decedent at his death, the recipient receives "fruit" matured by the
decedent. And if a conversion is made of rights, other than rights to
income (fruit), which the successor acquired from decedent, and those
rights had grown in value during the period held by decedent, the seller
of them benefits to an ascertainable extent from the "tree" cultivated
by the decedent. This tree is unique in that it is both mature and im-
mature at any given time; it can always be sold for a "fair market
value," but it can also be retained without fear of spoilage. Usage of
52. 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, § 13.54 (1942).
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the seed-fruit-tree trichotomy also emphasizes the special privilege that
property-sale income, the tree in the analogy, has enjoyed in the past.53
Section 126 Income Arising from "Seed" Planted by Decedent.
The keynote for this concept was indicated by Mr. Justice Cardozo
in 1936. To the contention that a contingent claim existing on March
1, 1913, was transmuted into capital on that date, he retorted that "we
do not identify the seed with the fruit it will yield."'5 4 Accordingly,
items such as possible future partnership profits55 and a past custom
of decedent's employer to pay a bonus 56 have been excluded from
decedent's gross estate. Such items are not influenced by Section
22(b) (3) or Section 113 (a) (5), since a contention that something was
acquired by bequest, devise or inheritance would be academic because
the "something" has only a zero basis. When payments were made to
a successor before the 1942 Act, the full amount received was held
to be either income taxable under Section 22(a) or a gift from the
payer. Payments on a valueless note were held to be income under this
approach,57 while voluntary payments made to a widow were gifts.58
The addition of Section 126 has made the gift construction much less
probable; renewal premiums59 and voluntary bonus payments60 have
been held taxable through its application. Since such payments would
have been taxable income to decedent had he lived and received the
amount, the rationale of the Section, that receipts arising from decedent's
lifetime efforts are clearly within its scope, will render taxable the
amounts received by a successor. The prime utility of Section 126 in
this area, then, is its reduction of a possible gift construction being
placed upon these payments."'
53. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1942,
77th Cong., 2d Sess., 89 (1942) (remarks of Randolph Paul); 83 CONG. REC. 4930
(1938) (remarks of Senator LaFollette).
54. United States v. Safety Car Heating and Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88 (1936).
The Court recognized, however, that a subsequent receipt of the claim necessitated a
referral to the primary contacts made before the 1913 date. Id. at 99. A dissent was
filed by Justices Sutherland, Butler and Roberts.
55. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935). But if the right to share in
possible future profits is capable of valuation at death, and hindsight is not necessary
to value the right, then that value is includible in the gross estate. McClennen v.
Commissioner, 131 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1942).
56. See O'Daniel's Estate v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1949).
57. Helvering v. Roth, 115 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1940).
58. Louise K. Aprill, 13 T.C. 707 (1949) (pre-1942 Act governed).
59. Estate of Remington, 9 T.C. 99 (1947).
60. Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951).
61. ,Supra note 2. See also I.T. 4027, 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 9, which ruled payments
voluntarily made to a widow will be considered gifts only when no services had been
rendered the donor by the recipient or anyone else.
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There exists an area where, although there might be no valuable
rights for inclusion in the gross estate, subsequent receipts will be neither
gifts nor Section 126 income. In some cases decedent will have con-
tracted to have his estate or successor receive future partnership income
which right is too speculative to justify valuation at death. When the
involuntary payments are made by the partnership, a gift construction
is not possible. The possibility exists, however, that the payments are
in lieu of all other claims on the partnership which would have been
available to the decedent. If so, the payments by the living partners are
the purchase price of this interest; the only purpose of the percentage-
of-profits price is to measure the value of the decedent's partnership
interest at death.62 When the decedent has no capital account at the
time of his death, however, a sale construction is less likely and subse-
quent receipts from the partnership constitute ordinary income to the
successor. 63 The fact that the decedent's successor is often a new
partner in these cases and hence taxable under Section 22(a) minimizes
the importance of Section 126 in this situation.
Emphasizing the importance of Section 126, however, where later
payments to successors are not voluntary, are the contingent claims,
unvalued at death, which are paid after decedent's death. Here there
can be neither gift nor sale construction. The precise language of the
Section is clearly applicable, and anything that would have been income
to the decedent retains its characterization when collected. 64 If the
contingent claims do have some value at death, then Section 126 will
also eliminate application of the old "conversion of corpus" argument;
but when such a valuation is made, the seed analogy becomes less
pertinent.
Section 126 Income Arising from "Fruit" matured by Deced-
ent. Once evaluation of an interest is made for estate tax purposes, the
"conversion of corpus" argument replaces the gift construction as the pri-
mary obstacle to income taxation of the amounts received by decedent's
successor. It was this hindrance which led to the Enright rationale of
amounts taxable in the decedent's final return. One of the primary objec-
tives of the 1942 legislation was to relieve such concentration of income
by providing for taxability to the recipient of the income. The minimal
scope of Section 126 is, therefore, the inclusion of amounts which would
have been decedent's income under the pre-1942 law. That this is only
the minimal purpose is verified by the fact that amounts not taxable to
62. Pope v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 420 (1st Cir. 1930).
63. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
64. United States v. Archer, 174 F.2d 353 (1st Cir. 1949).
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decedent under Enright65 have been held taxable under Section 126.66
Since decedent's final return will now be filed in accordance with normal
accounting methods, all omitted legal claims, including quantum meruit
rights, comprise "income in respect of a decedent" when collected or
transferred.67
Both inchoate claims, discussed previously, and these legally ma-
tured rights are based on past activity of the decedent. A more subtle
situation arises where decedent had contracted to have future income
paid to his successors and the status of the business entity is sufficient
for one to evaluate the right. Since the "conversion of corpus" argu-
ment was used here, some courts indicated that the successor became
a new partner, taxable under Section 22 (a).6s In order to take advantage
of the deduction on account of estate tax, the amounts are now properly
includible under Section 126. They dearly can be classified as decedent's
income since decedent must have given consideration before any con-
tractual rights arose. Decedent's efforts established the contractual
right, and the mere fact that the reciprocal consideration is measured
by future profits does not justify a distinction from any other legal
claims perfected by decedent. The value of all are equally due to the
fruit brought to maturity by his energies.
The phrase "brought to maturity" expresses the different treat-
ment that some would still give "rights to income" and rights to other
varieties of property. A decedent's successor need do nothing in order
for income rights to mature, but a successor who acquires rights to
other varieties of property has only that property unless he converts it
by sale or exchange. Those who would import significance to this dis-
tinction consider it one thing to pick fruit which is itself income, but
deem it quite different not only to be required to pick the fruit but also
65. In Randolph Peyton, 44 B.T.A. 1246 (1941), the Board held that moral obliga-
tions, having no basis in quantu neriit, paid to a decedent's estate by his former
partners were not subject to tax in the decedent's final return.
66. In Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951), voluntary
payments were made by decedent's former employer to his estate. The court held the
estate taxable under Section 126 since the executors ". . . in contemplation of law con-
tinued the legal personalities of the employees and were specifically taxed under Section
126(a) upon receipts for services by their testators. . . ." Id. at 314.
67. Ralph R. Huesman, 16 T.C. 656 (1951) (bonus due decedent at death)';
Sarah L Narischkine, 14 T.C. 1128 (1950) (alimony arrearages owed decedent at death) ;
Fred Basch, 9 T.C. 627 (1947) (bonus and interest due decedent) ; It re Conner's Will,
75 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Surr. Ct. 1948) (accounts receivable due decedent).
68. See First Nat'l. Bank of Mobile v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 172 (5th Cir.
1950) ; cf. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935). This is the situation in which
the courts could hold that if the payments satisfy all claims the decedent had against
the business, the payments to the successor are in payment of a sale of the decedent's
interest in the business. Supra notes 62 and 63 and text. As to the basis of that interest
in the successor's hands, see the text discussion, infra.
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to haul it to market and exchange it for income. Such a conceptual
approach to concrete tax cases would result in illogical variances.
Suppose, for example, decedent farmer bequeathed son A accounts
receivable worth $100,000, and son B a grape crop likewise worth
$100,000; assume decedent had a zero basis in both assets. Shortly
after decedent's death, A sells his receivables and B his grapes, each
receiving $100,000. Under the position taken above, while A would be
taxable upon the entire $100,000,e9 B's proceeds would be entirely tax
exempt.70 Moreover, if B had received only $90,000 for the grapes, the
position taken means B can claim a $10,000 loss in his personal return.
Such an anomalous result is rationalized in terms of a "taxable event."
Until rights in property have been converted to rights to income there is
no taxable event.
Section 126 Income Arising from a "'Tree" Cultivated by Decedent.
The necessity for a taxable event before income arises for tax purposes
prevents the mere holding of property from engendering taxable in-
come. 71 Were it simply a matter of awaiting a taxable event before
subjecting economic income to tax, no serious problem would arise. But
Section 113(a) (5) of the Code provides that when a person dies and
leaves property to a successor, the basis to the successor shall be the
fair market value at decedent's death. While the very existence of a
fair market value emphasizes the fact that the only thing the successor
need do to convert his property tree into income fruit is to enter the
marketplace, the past operation of Section 113(a) (5) has meant that
upon doing so he received income only to the extent by which the
selling price exceeded his new basis. 72 The most important inquiry in
69. Dixon v. United States, 96 F.Supp. 986 (E.D. Ken. 1950).
70. Rose J. Linde, 17 T.C. 584 (1951), Comm'r nonacq. 4 P-H FED. TAX SERV.
76,187 (1952). For a discussion of this case, see note 77, infra.
Typical of the arguments made in support of such a result are: "... rights to
proceeds of sale are not rights to income for the purposes of § 126, but are capital
assets to be treated the same as other assets, regardless of the fact that they are ...
ordinarily productive of taxable gain when converted into cash .. " Scott, A Critique
of Section 126, 26 TAXES 127, 133 (1948); ". . . although Congress obviously sought
a fair reflection of income, 'it is immaterial that all possibility of escaping an income
tax is not barred'.... ." Wright, Taxatio; of "Income in Respect of a Decedent,"
31 Nan. L. Ray. 522 (1952).
71. Estate of Burnett, 2 T.C. 897 (1943).
72. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.113(a)(5)-1. This provision does not operate in
favor of the taxpayer in all instances; if decedent's basis was higher than the fair
market value at his death, the taxpayer takes the lower basis which is a tax dis-
advantage. Herbert's Estate v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 756 (3rd Cir. 1943). But in
modern times when the norm is inflation, much income escapes taxation when property
is subsequently sold. Since § 126 is concerned only with income, it applies only when
decedent's basis is lower than the market value at his death. Where decedent's basis
is higher than that figure there would be a "loss in respect of a decedent" and the
statute is inapplicable.
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interpreting the 1942 Act is the extent to which Section 126 limits the
operation of Section 113 (a) (5); when a taxable event does occur to
what extent will the successor realize "income in respect of a decedent"?
That there is a difference between original income earned by the
successor and income from the sale of property left by decedent has
been realized in the field of estate income taxation. An estate is entitled
to deduct in its income tax return amounts of the current income which
are "to be distributed currently" or amounts "properly paid or credited"
to legatees, heirs or beneficiaries if the latter report the income on their
tax returns.73 This rule has been held not to apply, however, where the
estate income arose from sales of property left by a decedent. 74
Although the courts talk generally in terms of corpus appreciation in
such cases, it is significant that they comprehend the fact that the
decedent had greater contacts with the income than did the estate.
Maximum beneficial contacts of decedent with property-sale pro-
ceeds exist in cases where the decedent leaves the property subject to
a non-personal 75 contract for sale. Since property in the goods still
remains in decedent at his death, no "right to income" replaces the
property itself in decedent's estate. To hold that this difference in-
fluences subsequent income taxation of amounts received on account of
the contract would be superficial; decedent's efforts gave rise to the
subsequent income no less than if the property in the goods had been
transferred to the vendee at decedent's death.7 6 , It should not be ma-
terial that the contract is not one specifically enforceable; even con-
tractual damages are intended to satisfy the proximate expectations of
the parties. The proper treatment of the excess of the contractual
amount due the decedent over his basis would be to include it as a
separate item in his gross estate as a right to income. Inclusion of this
figure in the value given the property for estate tax purposes, however,
should not be allowed to camouflage the income right procured through
decedent's labors. Decedent died owning a contractual right to income
and, as the direct creation of his efforts, the net value of the claim should
invariably be characterized as Section 126 income when received.
73. IiNr. REv. CODE § 162(b), (c).
74. Dunlop v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1948); Burchenal v. Com-
missioner, 150 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1945) ; In re Rogers' Estate, 143 F.2d 695 (2d Cir.
1944).
75. A contract that has as its object personal services by the decedent would be
discharged upon his death. 2 WILLisToN ON CONTRACTS § 411 (1936).
76. It is not within the scope of this note to discuss the intricacies of passage of
title. Assume a decedent had contracted with his business partners for them to purchase
his interest at death; would that be a sale or a contract to sell? There is a disagreement.
1 WILLISTON ON SALES § 6 (1948). Certainly results should not depend upon words
like "sale" or "contract for sale" which are themselves controversial.
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While decedent had "title" to this right to income prior to death,
cases will arise where decedent had initiated contractual negotiations
not completed at the time of his death. Here it will be argued the
result should be different since no matured right existed when decedent
died. 77 Few would base this argument on the theory that the right had
not legally matured at decedent's death since tax law is not concerned
with refinements of title; rather, the argument would allege a different
result should follow because the decedent's contacts had not been suffi-
cient to consummate the transaction and further efforts were required
by-the successor. It would be a strange corpus juris that required brok-
erage commissions be paid when contracts were sufficiently initiated by
a broker,78 but refused to inspect a decedent's efforts in an analogous
situation. Not much realism is required for one to apply the analogy
to situations in which the successor sells the property involved to the
person with whom decedent was negotiating. The decedent's selling
efforts were the efficient cause of the sale of the property to that vendee.
But there is no indication that Congress intended Section 126
income to be limited to instances in which a subsequent-to-death
sale of the property resulted from decedent's activities. It is not his
efforts to sell the property which is important; instead, it is his careful
cultivation of the property during life which is significant. The value
of his productive efforts are clearly measurable by the difference between
his basis and the fair market value of the property when he dies. The
successor can enter the market place and receive this market value; to
the extent that the value exceeds decedent's basis, the income arises from
77. The puzzling case of Rose J. Linde, 17 T.C. 584 (1951), probably belongs in
this category. Decedent had been a grape farmer; at the time of his death he had
contributed his grape crop to various cooperatives in return for a prorata share of
the proceeds after the pools had been "liquidated." He died before liquidation, and
taxpayer was bequeathed his right in the unliquidated wine pools. The pools were finally
liquidated and the taxpayer received the proceeds. The Commissioner contended the
proceeds were taxable under § 126 because they arose from "deferred purchase agree-
ments" the decedent had made with the cooperative. The Tax Court (Judge Hill) replied
that there had been no sale, but rather the decedent had retained an equitable title,
the cooperative becoming in effect a trustee. Since there was no sale, there was no
right to income bequeathed the taxpayer; hence, Judge Hill said that the taxpayer's
equitable interest was subject to § 113 (a) (5) which boosted her basis to the market value
of the interest when decedent died. Section 126 was held to be inapplicable.
The case seems completely erroneous. It is certainly inconsistent with the other
§ 126 cases which, when confronted by a problem of characterizing proceeds received
by a successor, project the legal personality of the decedent onto the scene, Bausch's
Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951); and if the receipts would have
been taxable to decedent had he lived, then the successor is taxable in an identical
manner under § 126. The Tax Court ignored one of the foremost principles of tax
law, that the incidents of taxation should not depend upon technicalities of title. Corliss
v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930). The Commissioner, of course, nonacquiesced. 4 P-H
FED. TAX SERv. 1176,187 (1952).
78. 4 WILLISTON ON CONTRAcTs § 1030A, n. 7 (1936).
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decedent's efforts. The necessity for realization will defer the taxable
event until the successor sells any property acquired by bequest, devise
or inheritance; income to him then should be measured by using the
donor's basis as the measure of gain.79 By so doing, Section 126 income
will not be governed by superficialities of contractual status-most
property left by a decedent is easily saleable in the market. If a suc-
cessor benefits from this increased value, it is because the amounts he
receives in excess of the decedent's basis constitute "income in respect
of a decedent."
The courts must now define the new scope of Section 113 (a) (5).
It is still fully applicable when the decedent's basis exceeds the market
value of property at his death, since there would then be no advance
in value of the property in decedent's hands. 80 If at death the property
is incapable, as a practical matter, of being sold, the Section should
still dominate even though a theoretical "market value" might exist.8 '
Perhaps there are other areas where Section 113(a) (5) will still
control; if so, the courts must be able to say that for some definite
reason the spread between the decedent's basis and the higher market
value at death does not yield "income in respect of a decedent." 82 The
79. The operative time to determine a successor's basis is date of death (or the
optional valuation date, one year later). If at that time the market value is in excess
of the decedent's basis, § 126 should give the successor the lower basis; even though
the successor sells the property for less than this amount, that basis should apply.
Although the successor will then realize no taxable income, "income in respect of a
decedent" has served to reduce a loss otherwise reportable if the higher market value
basis were used. The necessity for realization to occur permits the successor to fully
offset against inchoate § 126 income all subsequent depreciation until date of sale.
But decedent's successful efforts should not go unrecognized simply because the successor
has failed to cultivate the property as efficiently.
Another problem that will arise when the successor does not immediately convert
the property is the characterization of income received, as ordinary or capital. In such
cases there would seem to be no necessity to classify it by reference to the decedent
since the successor has exposed the property to the risks of his type of endeavor.
80. Supra note 79. This is obvious. Suppose the property is sold the day decedent
dies for the lower market value. Use of decedent's basis would give a loss.
81. In some cases a successor will receive a non-assignable right that will be
given a fictitious market value for estate tax purposes. Bank of California v. Com-
missioner, 133 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1932). The successor must be given a basis on this
date, but although the actual result of §§ 126 and 113 (a) (5) may be to give a successor
the lower basis in the majority of cases, there is no language necessitating that result.
If a non-assignable right fell below the decedent's basis before it became assignable
and subject to the successor's unfettered control, it is difficult to say the successor
received "income in respect of a decedent." It was the decedent who caused the claim
to be non-assignable; this prevented the successor from realizing upon it had he chosen
to do so.
82. For example, in the situation stated in note-81, Mspra, the justification would
be: The basic idea of § 126 is that a successor should have to report as income the
portion of appreciation in value that took place when the decedent held, the property,
offsetting against such an amount losses that resulted to the property when held by the
successor. The legal concept behind this purpose is waiver; if the successor can easily
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difficulty of drawing this line is of no consequence; for, as Mr. Justice
Holmes remarked in a famous income tax case, ". . . [T]hat is the ques-
tion in pretty much everything worth arguing in the law. ' ' 3  That a
successor will usually take either (1) the lower of the decedent's basis
or the fair market value at his death whenever the market value ex-
presses true marketability, or (2) only the market value, if no sale
actually can be made, as his new basis, provides a functional criterion
of Section 126 income when realization finally occurs. Precise delinea-
tion will accompany the cases; that is the province of case law.
Code Section 126 sanctions income taxation of those proceeds
received by a decedent's successor which were the resultant of the
decedent's efforts. The general test to be employed is: If the decedent
had lived and received the proceeds in controversy, would he have been
subjected to income taxation? If so, the successor who receives such
amounts is likewise taxable. When the proceeds arise from the sale of
property that the successor vendor had received from the decedent, an
additional inquiry is required: Was decedent's basis lower than the
actual fair market value of the goods at his death? If not, Section
126 is inapplicable since the decedent's efforts have not increased the
value of the property and the Section is only concerned with "income
in respect of a decedent." (emphasis added) But an affirmative re-
sponse will provide the successor with the decedent's basis for measur-
ing subsequent income when a taxable event ensues.8 4 The regulations
specifically provide that when Section 126 applies, Section 113(a) (5)
does not.8 5 While the Commissioner has not yet fully interpreted
Section 126 in its relation to Section 113(a) (5), it is anticipated that
he will soon do so to effectuate the Congressional purpose of constrict-
ing the former scope of Section 113 (a) (5) so as to avoid the previous
inequities caused by that Section. 6
convert to a clearly measurable market value when he receives the property, the statu-
tory purpose is not to be frustrated if he chooses not to do so. But if the successor
cannot convert the property, there is no method of foretelling the value of the property
when conversion becomes possible. The necessities of efficient tax administration compel
the application of a definite basis at a time certain, not dependent upon factual inquiries
as to when property becomes assignable. Therefore, § 113 (a) (5) controls giving the
successor the higher fictitious market value at date of death.
If that Section is to apply in other cases, a similar justification must be given.
83. Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161 (1925).
84. This basis should be used even though the sale price is below the substituted
basis derived from the decedent, supra note 79.
85. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.126-1.
86. As to these inequities, see supra note 70 and text.
The legislative history is not easily interpreted, but it does yield some indication
of the reasons for passage of § 126. Randolph Paul, tax adviser to the Secretary of the
Treasury, made two specific recommendations to the Ways and Means Committee
which investigated the areas where tax reform was needed: (1) He recommended
